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Over the past decade, the governments in most Latin-American countries have
substantially expanded the number of firms they own and control. Today such
firms are found not only in traditional public utility activities but also in raw
materials extraction and processing and in a wide range of manufacturing
activities. Now that the promotion of exports is high on the national agenda of
many Latin-American countries, the strengths and weaknesses of state-owned
enterprises as exporters have become an issue of considerable importance.
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN OIL AND MINING
State-owned enterprises in Latin America that are engaged in the extraction
of nonrenewable raw materials tend to occupy a special place in their econ-
omies. The political history of the area has set these industries apart as special
cases. In any case, even if no such distinction existed, the nonrenewable raw
materials encompass some of the most prominent enterprises in the area.
The importance of state-owned enterprises in nonrenewable raw materials
is suggested by the figures in the table.
1 To discern how the public nature of
these enterprises may affect their export performance, it may help to take a
closer look at some of the industries concerned. For that purpose, two industries
have been singled out: oil and iron ore.
The Case of Oil
All the state-owned enterprises in Latin-America's petroleum industry were
brought into being with one common motivation, namely, to end foreign control.
There were many reasons for governments to desire such control. In the
context of this paper, the important question is how control is likely to affect
the foreign trade of Latin-American countries. To shed light on that question,STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 99
PRINCIPAL STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN LATIN AMERICA ENGAGED IN OIL AND
SELECTED MINERALS, MID-1970S





Oil Venezuela Corporacion Venezolana de
Petroleo S.A. (PETROVEN)
Brazil Petrobras
Mexico Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX)
Argentina Yacimientos Petroliferos
Fiscales de Argentina (YPF)
Copper Chile Corporacion Nacional del
Cobre de Chile (CODELCO)
Empresa Nacional de Minera
(ENAMI)
Mexico Compania Minera de Cananea,
S.A.1
Mexicana de Cobre
Peru Empresa Minera del Centro
del Peru (CENTROMIN)l ^
Empresa Minera del Peru
Tin Bolivia Corporacion Minera de Bolivia
(COMIBOL)
Iron ore Brazil Companhia Vale do Rio Doce
(CVRD)
Venezuela C.V.G. Ferrominera del
Orinoco S.A.
Chile Compania de Acero del
Pacifico S.A. (CAP)
Peru Empresa Minera del Peru




















































Sources: Various, including [4; 19; and 34, pp. 34-43].
Includes substantial private interests.
2
Actual sales figures are not available; these estimates are calculated by multi-
plying mine capacity with a US Bureau of Mines estimate of the average f.o.b. per
ton value of bauxite imported into the US in 1976, $24.16; see [25, p. 202].
I begin with another: When the big multinational oil companies were in charge,
what pricing and output policies were they pursuing, and why?
Before the various nationalizations of oil companies in Latin America had
occurred, their enterprises were securely linked to a worldwide oligopoly that
was managed by a handful of US and European firms, the so-called interna-
tional majors. Until the early 1970s, most of the world's oil flow took place
through the vertically integrated structures which such firms had created.
Vertical integration gave the companies considerable discretion in fixing the
transfer prices at each stage in the vertical chain. The majors chose to exercise
that discretion by capturing most of their profits in the transfer of oil between
the wellhead and the refinery; by contrast, the refineries and distribution100 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
systems were typically obliged to operate close to the break-even point, even at
an apparent loss [1, pp. 89-191; and 32, pp. 46-50 and 173-97]. One authority
notes:
... during the second half of the fifties the international majors were realizing little
or no profit on the transportation, refining, and marketing of Middle East Oil. Vir-
tually the entire profit... was in production. [21, p. 70]
The oil companies chose this strategy out of a recognition of the fundamental
strengths and weaknesses of their own positions.
2 The highest barrier to entry
in the vertical chain existed at the stage of crude oil production; the lowest, at
the distribution level. If competitors were to be discouraged at all levels, it
made sense for the oil companies to try to capture the available profits at the
stage at which newcomers could have the greatest difficulty of entry.
3
Because the oil companies were charging what they thought the traffic would
bear for their crude oil, most economists were surprised by the magnitude and
persistence of the rise in crude oil prices that occurred after the oil companies
lost control in 1974. With the help of hindsight, some of the reasons for the
increase now seem much clearer [33, pp. 39-57; and 42, pp. 159-78].
By the end of the 1960s, the oligopoly in world oil markets was weakening
rapidly. Independent oil companies, such as Occidental Oil and Continental
Oil, were entering the international oil market on a large scale. Competition
from these new sources in international markets tended to weaken the prices
of crude oil and its products during much of the 1960s, thereby masking the
fact that basic changes were taking place in the underlying supply-demand
balance.
In the early 1970s, the tightness of supplies began to dominate the market.
Nonetheless, at that stage, the multinational oil companies had a much less
roseate view of long-term demand prospects than did some of the oil-exporting
countries. Accordingly, the multinationals began to resist the pressures for even
more price increases. From their viewpoint, the new price levels seemed to pose
a threat to sales. With high economies of scale present in the refining operation,
a drop-off in sales would represent an even greater threat to profits. Moreover,
the high prices would have placed new stresses on the balance of payment
positions of some importing countries; and the added demands almost certainly
would have invited the wrath of governments and consumers in those
countries.
4
The Arab oil embargo of 1973-74 generated prices in the spot market far
higher than anything previously encountered. At this stage, the private inter-
national oil companies slipped into the background, leaving the price-fixing
function for crude oil to the oil-exporting countries. Thereafter, the price-
making function of the private companies consisted mainly of maintaining some
consistency between the prices of different grades of oil, different oil products,
and different markets.STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 101
So far, the oil-exporting governments have been responsible for three rounds
of sharp price increases — one round associated with the 1973-74 embargo,
another with the Iran revolution of 1979, and a third with the Iran-Iraq war.
In the first two instances, the increases represented ratifications of prices al-
ready registered in the spot market. In both instances, the increases proved too
high to be sustainable in real terms; after the initial increases, world inflation
and widespread price-rebating substantially reduced the real size of the
increase.
So far, therefore, the record suggests that the governments of oil-exporting
countries have exercised their oligopoly power boldly; but the exercise of that
power has occurred through the unplanned initiatives of, individual countries,
not through the agreements among the countries.
5 A priori, such a conclusion
would hardly be surprising; whereas the private firms share a common interest
in high and stable profits, the oil-exporting countries have enormously diverse
interests [31, pp. 63-84]. Some are embarrassed by their increased riches;
others are needful of all they can earn. Some have close political ties with im-
porting countries; others see the importers as political adversaries. Finding a
common pattern of behavior for the group, especially in cases in which the
pattern may require substantial compromises by some, entails considerable
difficulties.
Based on this performance, I conclude that OPEG's capacity to impose a
coordinated strategy upon its members has yet to be tested. The system that
exists is patently unstable on the upside; it could also be unstable on the down-
side. That possibility will be relevant in the 1980s, of course, if adjustments in
supply and demand bring about a surplus in productive capacity; and even
then, only if the countries that have a surfeit of foreign exchange reserves will
not or cannot play the role of balance wheel as suppliers. Estimates of whether
such a condition will develop in the 1980s are sure to vary.
The stability of the oil market on the downside is also rendered uncertain
by various other changes in the structure of the market. One such change is
in the number of participants. In the 1980s, the number of firms engaged in
the international distribution of oil and its products will be quite large, too
large to generate a pattern of behavior that would characterize a tight
oligopoly. In addition to 8 to 10 majors, one must count on a dozen or more
state-owned enterprises, plus 15 or 20 private independent companies.
The capacity of state-owned oil companies to act in concert as part of a
highly integrated international oligopoly is particularly in question. At times,
to be sure, such companies often seem free to do anything that private com-
panies would do. In the case of Petrobras, there have been evident ambitions to
create a vertically integrated multinational structure; in 1978, for instance,
prospecting was being conducted in seven different countries with other state-
owned enterprises, under contracts similar to those of the international oil
companies [3]. Pemex has acquired an affiliate in Spain and, according to inter-102 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
views conducted with officials in Mexico, has a hankering to acquire a distribu-
tion system in the southern part of the US. Meanwhile Petroven contrives to
maintain close links with the distribution systems of the multinational com-
panies which were once concessionaires in Venezuela.
At the same time, however, state-owned oil enterprises in Latin America
remain linked to the political process of their respective countries. [9, pp. 43-
65; and 22, p. 58].
6 Their ultimate obedience to the chief executive is never
seriously in question. To the extent that state-owned enterprises are responsive
to the distinctive internal priorities of the countries that own them, the probabil-
ity of effective concerted action is reduced.
The Case of Iron Ore
As the table indicates, the iron ore industry of Latin America, like the petro-
leum industry of that area, includes some major state-owned enterprises.
But the iron ore industry had differed from that of oil in a number of
critical ways. First, the world's iron ore markets have not been as closely con-
trolled and as tightly integrated as in the case of oil. Second, the demand for
iron ore, in contrast to that of oil, has been rather soft in the 1970s and has
presented more uncertain prospects for exporters of the product. Nevertheless,
there are certain underlying similarities between the behavior of state-owned
enterprises in iron ore and oil.
Like firms in the petroleum industry, those that mine iron ore and make
steel have always been faced with the uncertainties created by their high fixed
costs and low variable costs. In Europe, for several decades before World War
II, firms in these activities sought to reduce their risk by allocating the markets
for finished steel through cartels [14, pp. 203-16].
In the US, where cartels were officially frowned upon, the steel companies
sought stability by developing vertically integrated chains, stretching from the
iron ore mines to the steel-using fabricating plants. To a remarkable degree,
the American steel industry developed captive sources of iron ore, partly through
mining operations conducted in branches or subsidiaries, and partly through
closely linked firms that maintained a nominal independence from the steel
firms [39, p. 33; and 41, ch. 2].
Since World War II, however, the tightly integrated structure of the world
steel industry has been very much weakened. One of the key questions in as-
sessing the future of the state-owned ore exporters in Latin America is whether
the pressures that weakened the structure will persist.
The weakening of vertical integration in the world steel industry was due
first of all to a decline in the relative position of the established steelmakers,
particularly of the US producers. After World War II, the locational advan-
tages of the American steel industry in world markets were being rapidly
eroded. Originally, the industry was located in midcontinent, partly because of
its proximity to the rich Mesabi ores. After World War II, however, the richestSTATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 103
Mesabi ores were depleted. Moreover, the size of ships carrying iron ore rose
rapidly, reducing the costs of seaborne transportation by nearly two-thirds and
thereby adding to the disadvantages of the US industry [23, p. 60; and 12, pp.
90-123].
In addition, during the 1960s, Australia became a major new ore source,
while Japan appeared as a new user. Fortuitously their relative locations
generated complementary strengths. And these new participants in the world
ore market were slow to develop on vertically integrated lines.
The disposition of Japanese firms to avoid vertical integration in the 1960s
appears to have been based on certain transitory factors [24, p. 57]. To begin
with, Japan looked upon herself as short of foreign exchange, and therefore
not in a position to permit overseas investments. Moreover, Japanese firms
were engaged mainly in supplying their home market needs; and in that
market, they were free of some of the uncertainties that had stimulated the
steel firms of other countries to engage in vertical integration. MITI's practice
of pooling the purchases of all Japanese steel firms through a single negotiating
agent relieved individual Japanese firms of the risk that domestic competitors
might have a cheaper or more reliable ore supply. As for foreign competitors,
these were effectively excluded by Japan's restrictive import policies. Japanese
firms, therefore, were quite prepared at first to allow others to own their ore
sources.
Meanwhile, in the 1950s and 1960s, some US steel firms moved abroad in
their search to replace the waning Mesabi ores. These firms sought to own
their foreign sources, and for a while they seemed to be succeeding. But their
success was blunted in the first place by the fact that by 1960 Brazil and India
had placed their international ore trade in the hands of state-owned enterprises.
And it was given a further setback by the fact that in the 1970s, as the table
indicates, a wave of nationalizations of mining properties reduced the degree
of vertical integration even further.
So far, Brazil's sales policies appear to have been quite successful. Brazil's
production costs have been low, and its ores have been rich and plentiful,
thereby offering considerable room for price cutting when that has been neces-
sary. Although the demand for ore in world markets has slumped from time to
time during the past two decades, the trend in demand has been broadly up-
ward [16, p. 1, and passim]. On balance, the operation has been highly
profitable.
By the later 1970s, however, there were signs that the position of the Brazilian
ore industry might be changing. For one thing, the Brazilian steel industry,
principally owned by the state, was demanding larger amounts of ore. In addi-
tion, CVRD was rapidly increasing the number of its partnership arrangements
with European and Japanese iron ore users. Already by 1970, CVRD had com-
pleted agreements that committed mines and pelletizing plants in Brazil to104 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
German, Belgian, and Luxemburger users on a long-term basis. During the
1970s, joint ventures in ore processing plants were undertaken with Italian,
Japanese, and Spanish steel companies. And in the late 1970s, a large-scale min-
ing project was developed in partnership with a group of Japanese steel com-
panies.
7 Evidently, the long-term propensity of steelmakers and iron ore pro-
ducers for vertical links was beginning to reassert itself.
Meanwhile, in Venezuela, the iron ore industry also seemed headed for more
vertical integration, albeit by a different route.
In 1974, at the time of nationalization, Venezuelan iron ore was a compara-
tively minor factor in world supply, little more than one-fourth of Brazil's
output. In contrast to Brazil and most other developing countries, oil-rich
Venezuela had no great concern with balance of payment problems. More-
over, because Venezuela perceived itself the international leader in the de-
veloping countries' drive for higher raw material prices, Venezuela felt much
more constrained than Brazil in reducing its prices. Accordingly, Venezuela
expected to achieve stability by the time-tested recipe of the industry, namely,
by vertical integration within its national borders. In addition, plans for a huge
expansion in national steel production in the early 1980s — a fourfold or five-
fold increase — meant that at existing levels of production, at least half of
Venezuela's iron ore would soon have a ready domestic market.
Meanwhile, Venezuela's experiences in the sale of iron ore have underlined
one key point — that so-called long-term contracts in practice cannot provide
much assurance of stability for sellers. Unintegrated sellers of iron ore, both
state-owned and private, have typically tried to secure the stability they de-
sired by entering into long-term arrangements. The reduction in market un-
certainties, in transaction costs, and in the exposure to moral hazard have all
argued strongly for such commitments. But so-called long-term contracts have
proved perishable in practice.
The first evidence of that fact was provided by Venezuela itself, when in
1975 it abruptly abrogated some long-term contracts with German and British
buyers, on the grounds that the prices were too low. That experience was
followed a few years later by the quiet refusal of US Steel to buy all the ore to
which it was committed in its long-term contracts with Venezuela. The moral
to be drawn from these experiences plus numerous others like them all over the
world was painfully evident.
8
The future of iron ore exports from Latin America, like the future of exports
of petroleum, depends heavily on the general level of world demand for the
product. I cannot pretend to be able to choose knowledgeably from among the
wide range of forecasts that now are being circulated.
9 But apart from such
forecasts, there are some possible institutional developments that bear on Latin-
America's export prospects.
One such development may be the creation of an isolated high-cost steel
market in North America. It is unlikely that the US steel industry will be ableSTATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 105
to overcome the locational disadvantages that handicap it in international com-
petition. At the same time, Europe's steel industry is also suffering from the
pains of locational adjustment and surplus capacity. The situation in the two
areas is ripe for action that would push the burden of adjustment onto the
shoulders of future steel exporters such as Japan, South Korea, and Brazil.
Some of the restrictive structure, indeed, is already in place [38, pp. 25-31 and
38-39]. If the trend continues, the pressure on US industry to find the lowest-
priced ores will be even weaker than it is today, and the industry will probably
be found relying for its ores on Mesabi and Canada, with reduced need for
other supplies [6, p. 106].
Another possible development is the resumption of the vertical pattern of
organization among leading steel producers. As long as Japanese steel firms
refrained from developing a vertical structure, the compulsion on the part of
other steel exporters to control their ore sources was not very strong. With
Japanese steel prices setting the pace and with Japanese producers paying
the open market price for their ore, a competitor could afford to expose itself
to the vagaries of that market. However, the willingness of some Japanese mills
to acquire equity interests in oron ore mines in Latin America and Australia
— a willingness more evident in the 1970s than in the 1960s — opens up the
possibility that the drive toward vertical integration in the steel industry could
gather steam again. In that case, Brazil may be presented with a real problem,
given the fact that the country's ore production in the 1980s promises to exceed
its domestic needs. Venezuela may escape a part of the problem, provided that
its plans for the expansion of steel production are realized. But the realization
of these plans depends on two difficult conditions: the mobilization of technical
talent sufficient to operate a vastly expanded steel capacity; and the availability
of international markets sufficient to absorb the output. The probability that
both conditions will be satisfied in the 1980s is not very high.
If the mining enterprises of Brazil or Venezuela should find themselves in
difficulties, they could perhaps reduce their difficulties a little by playing one
trump card. This is the expansion of their bilateral barter deals, to include
an exchange of goods with other countries that may be having difficulties in the
marketing of their exports. Brazil's CVRD has already concluded bilateral
deals with Bulgaria, China, and Poland [8, p. 86; 10, p. 3; and 11, p. 2].
CVRD's experience with such deals could particularly dispose Brazil to the
somewhat increased use of barter or similar swap arrangements, especially in
trade with other developing nations and with communist countries.
Some Generalizations
Despite the seemingly distinctive details that are associated with the oil and
iron ore cases, both seem to point to a few key generalizations.
One of these is obvious, even trite. More important than the institutional
structure of the markets for oil and iron ore in determining the prospects for106 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
Latin-American exports is the underlying supply-demand situation. Cartels may
modify the effects of such a situation; but their impact is likely to be only
secondary.
Nevertheless, it is not unimportant to note that the possibility of forming
effective export cartels in the future is being undermined. In many industries
there has been steady increase in the number of firms in the international
market and a steady decline in the industry's concentration [40, p. 8]. The fact
that some of the new entrants are state-owned enterprises reduces the possibility
of creating effective cartels even further. Instead of being able to concentrate on
the common objective of high and stable profits, as a group of private
oligopolists from different countries are often in a position to do, the state-
owned enterprises are likely to find their ability to cooperate affected by the
differing situations of their respective govenments.
State-owned enterprises may also find it difficult to improve their prospects
for stability by the other available route, that is, by integrating vertically with
users of the raw materials located in foreign countries. Such integration usually
means a lessening of national control and may even require an export of capital
to set up downstream facilities on foreign soil. The prospect of state-owned
enterprises engaging on a large scale in activities of this sort is bound to evoke
some political opposition at home and to generate a political veto from time to
time. Accordingly, I expect that the growth of state-owned enterprises in Latin-
American countries will add a little to the instability and uncertainty that is so
often associated with the export of raw materials.
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN MANUFACTURING
Until a decade or two ago, Latin-America's exports of manufactured goods
were trivial in amount. By the 1970s, exports of manufactured goods from
Latin-American countries had begun to reach substantial proportions. So far,
however, state-owned enterprises have not played a very significant role in
such exports.
Inasmuch as data on exports goods are not ordinarily available by individual
state-owned enterprises, this conclusion can only be reached by inference. A
study of 265 large state-owned enterprises engaged in manufacturing in Latin
America shows that in the mid-1970s 228 were specialized in branches of
industry that did little or no exporting from their respective countries. Of the
47 remaining, 38 were in raw-material-processing industries, such as sugar,
petroleum products, and cement. Accordingly, the number of state-owned
enterprises engaged in exporting manufactured goods in substantial quantities
appears to be very low.
This is not a surprising result. Governments typically create state-owned en-
terprises in order to assert control over some key industry or to foreclose
foreign-owned subsidiaries from dominating the field. But governments tendSTATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 107
to avoid the nationalization of enterprises that they believe would present
formidable problems of management [18]. What this means, in effect, is that
foreign-owned manufacturing enterprises which are involved heavily in the
exportation of their output are likely to be protected against nationalization.
The state-owned enterprises that have been started from scratch by govern-
ments in the manufacturing field are also unlikely exporters, at least in the
early stages of their existence. Commonly, these enterprises are large-scale
capital-intensive affairs that require the mobilization of large quantities of
capital and the assumption of considerable financial risk. As a rule, projects
of this sort, epitomized by Venezuela's state-owned steel mills, face a long
run-in period before they have mastered the complex problems of quality
control and production reliability; during that period, they aim for the rela-
tively easy domestic market reserved for them by governmentally imposed
import barriers. Factors such as these explain why, so far, there have been
only a limited number of state-owned enterprises that have successfully ex-
ported large quantities of manufactured goods.
Strengths and Weaknesses
But what of the future?
State-owned enterprises have certain putative strengths, suggested in this
paper. Backed by the resources of the state, state-owned enterprises are typically
in a position to marshall capital in larger quantities and at lesser cost than
would be available to their domestic businessmen (though not necessarily to
foreign-owned enterprises). The capacity of state-owned enterprises to assume
the financial risks that go with large, lumpy investments also is relatively
strong. It also seems reasonable to build on the assumption that state-owned
enterprises are in a superior position to persuade their governments to impose
restrictions on imports or exports in ways that would be helpful to firm
strategies.
However, I have also suggested that state-owned enterprises may be saddled
with certain drawbacks as prospective exporters. One of these is the likelihood
that such enterprises will be inhibited at times from setting up elaborate facili-
ties in foreign countries. Moreover, it is hard to picture state-owned enter-
prises attaining quite the same flexibility of strategy as private exporters —
flexibility in the modification of products, in pricing policies, in the choice of
markets, in the choice of distribution channels, and so on.
How do these strengths and weaknesses square with the requirements for
successful exporting? Industrial products make one set of demands; consumer
products another. Products that must be sold in a continuous stream over a long
period of years, such as automobiles or pharmaceuticals, require one approach;
products that entail a single vast sale, such as a steel plant, require another.
In order to explore the implications of the special strengths and weaknesses of108 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
state-owned enterprises as they apply to the various categories of exports, I have
distinguished crudely between two groups: standardized manufactures, that is,
those whose characteristics change very little over extended periods of time and
whose characteristics are similar even when offered by different sellers; and
nonstandardized manufactures, that is, products with more mercurial or more
diverse characteristics.
The Export of Standardized Manufactures
From time to time, state-owned enterprises have demonstrated that their
capacity to mobilize financial resources and to accept business risks can con-
tribute substantially to the export of standardized products. The familiar cases
are those in which the national producers and exporters of the product are too
small for any of them to maintain adequate inventories, adhere to expected
quality, or promote the product as a class; processed coffee, edible oils, and re-
fined sugar are cases in point. State-owned enterprises, armed in some cases
with the coercive power to compel producers and exporters to pool their re-
sources, may be the only available response [43]. More important in the future
growth of Latin-American exports of standardized products, however, will be
the manufactured products that are based on nonrenewable resources. Once
again, products based on crude oil and iron ore provide leading examples.
Petrochemicals represent a case in which state-owned enterprises are being
used by the government to enter a large-scale, technologically difficult industry
requiring substantial capital commitments and presenting difficult challenges
of organization. State-owned enterprises are likely to represent a major force
in Latin-America's petrochemical industry in the 1980s. Brazil anticipates
raising state participation in its national petrochemicals production to 65
percent by 1983, squeezing back foreign ownership in the process; and Mexico
plans to raise the state's share to 94 percent by that year [35]. Besides, official
Mexican plans contemplate that petrochemical exports will grow throughout
the decade of the 1980s by 14 percent annually, starting from a base of about
$150 million [26, p. 134]. Similar plans are found in practically every other
oil-exporting country [37; and 5, various issues].
There is a considerable risk that the aggregate capacity of the world's
petrochemical plants in the 1980s will substantially exceed demand. If that
occurs, the ability of Latin-American countries to market their petrochemicals
will turn mainly on two key questions: whether they themselves are net ex-
porters of crude oil, and whether crude oil will be in short supply. By tying
crude oil sales to petrochemical sales, the oil-exporting countries such as
Venezuela and Mexico will be in a position to compel the rest of the world to
accept their petrochemical products, even if the petrochemical facilities in the
importing countries are thereby forced to cut back.
1
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Brazil, meanwhile, many find themselves paying very high prices to oil exporters
and being pressured by the exporters to accept petrochemicals on a tied basis.
If oil is not in short supply, however, the difficulties of Latin-American coun-
tries may prove even more widespread. It goes without saying that Mexico,
Venezuela, and the other exporters will be deprived of a critical source of
support; but paradoxically it may make the problems of Brazil's petrochemical
plants even more acute.
The reason for expecting increased difficulties for petrochemical plants such
as those in Brazil has to do with the pricing policies of the oil-exporting coun-
tries. Many branches of the petrochemicals industry have already begun to
experience periodic episodes of price-cutting in recent years as the number of
sellers has increased. Most sellers from the oil-exporting countries will start
with a major cost advantage, namely, on-site gas produced as a byproduct of
crude oil production. In addition, producers in the oil-exporting countries will
almost certainly be subsidized through a preferential price for liquid feed-
stocks and energy, and through preferential terms for their capital. Such
preferential pricing is not confined to state-owned enterprises or to less devel-
oped countries; but it promises to be especially prominent in the sales of
state-owned enterprises from less developed countries in the 1980s. Some of the
state-owned sellers will have made alliances with established distributors in the
importing countries, including some leading multinational oil or chemical com-
panies; others may even acquire existing firms with established positions in
the importing markets; but others perforce will have to break their way into
such markets through new distribution channels, thus adding to the stress.
In iron ore, the analysis runs on similar lines. Again, the general supply-
demand situation dominates. If iron ore and steel are in easy supply, the fabri-
cated products will be hard to sell. Pelletized ores that are linked through
vertical integration to foreign buyers may find a market;
1
1 but pelletized ores
that must be sold in the open market may encounter greater difficulties. As for
finished steel, the chances that it can be satisfactorily marketed abroad in pe-
riods of glut are especially slim for all the reasons cited earlier. The fact that
such steel production will have been subsidized in various ways can be expected
to add to the difficulties that exporting countries are likely to encounter.
If state-owned enterprises do encounter difficulties of this sort, however,
there is a strong possibility that they will try to expand the use of bilateral barter
deals of the sort mentioned earlier, enlisting the help of their respective gov-
ernments to mount such deals. One can only conjecture whether deals of this
kind can account for a considerable volume of exports in the 1980s. In any
case, problems such as these promise during the 1980s to lend a special degree
of volatility and uncertainty to the exports of processed raw materials by the
state-owned enterprises of Latin America.110 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
The Export of Nonstandardized Manufactures
There are numerous signs that various Latin-American countries are master-
ing the problems involved in the economic production of relatively nonstan-
dardized products. As the comparative advantage of Latin America continues
to shift, more Latin-American enterprises, public and private, will produce
for the export market.
Successful marketing of such products is helped by a substantial measure of
vertical integration. In the US, for instance, 37 percent of the manufactured
goods imported from developing countries in 1977 consisted of transfers between
affiliates, rather than of arm's-length transactions between independent parties
[13, pp. 159-84], a fact reflecting the existence of a vertical structure in the
firms responsible for the transfers. That percentage is likely to grow as imports
from developing countries become more sophisticated; for instance, the com-
parable figure for US imports from OECD countries — countries that already
export highly sophisticated products — comes to 61 percent.
The reasons for the internalization of the import transactions in sophisticated
goods have been explored at length, and found to rest on solid considerations
[20, pp. 209-22]. If the goods being imported are not standardized or if there
are important economies of scale in distribution, internalization has advantages.
The buyer must see the seller as capable of producing the desired product at
the desired time; and the seller must see the buyer as capable of analyzing the
market's needs, making the sale, and providing any required after-sale service.
That degree of confidence is more readily available between affiliates than
between arm's-length parties.
As I observed earlier, my assumption is that state-owned enterprises from
Latin-American countries will feel somewhat inhibited about setting up
elaborate assembly or after-sale servicing facilities in the markets of foreign
countries. Nevertheless, there has been an extraordinary case or two in Latin
America in which state-owned enterprises appear to have been able to create
the necessary distributional links in foreign markets, enough to market highly
differentiated products successfully. One such case is that of Interbras, a sub-
sidiary of Brazil's Petrobras. Using the credit and organizational facilities under-
written by its formidable parent, Interbras has undertaken to promote the
export of a wide spectrum of Brazilian goods, including goods from private
sources. Although its exports have been concentrated overwhelmingly in a
small number of raw materials and their immediate derivatives, some tens of
millions of dollars of sales have also been effected in highly differentiated
products, including tractors and household appliances [15, pp. 9-14].
State-owned enterprises also may have special strengths in the handling of one
particular kind of export, that is, large-scale one-shot package deals such as
the building of railroads and ports and the construction of large housing com-
plexes. These deals have characteristically included the following ingredients:STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 111
a large dose of public financing on preferential terms; a large group of engi-
neering, construction, and manufacturing firms, private as well as public, in
an effective consortium; and a commitment to accept large quantities of goods
in payment for such exports.
1
2 To be sure, deals of this sort can be put to-
gether by some private firms; the Japanese trading companies, for instance,
have demonstrated a highly developed capacity for arranging undertakings of
a similar nature with the help of their governments [44, pp. 210-19]. But the
public character of Interbras probably has enhanced its ability to arrange such
deals.
The success of Interbras in these export activities, however, may be due to
another factor. Interbras, it should be noted, is the offspring of a state-owned
enterprise that is outstanding both in the scope of its internal resources and
the degree of its operating independence. Unlike most state-owned enter-
prises, Petrobras has readily set up affiliates in foreign countries. If state-owned
enterprises could be expected to develop a degree of freedom to operate in
overseas markets equivalent to that of Petrobras, the projection of their likely
participation in exports might well be more positive.
Such developments, however, tend to increase the autonomy of managers of
state-owned enterprises and to reduce the capacity of governments to control
them. Governments then may have to face a difficult choice: whether to re-
linquish some measure of control over the state-owned enterprises, or to reduce
the probability of successful exports. My assumption here — a critical assump-
tion in any projection — is that Latin-American governments will periodically
feel the need to rein in their state-owned enterprises, especially after those en-
terprises seem to be increasing their autonomy. On that assumption, state-
owned enterprises will operate under a handicap as exporters of nonstandardized
goods and services.
THE CRITICAL THEMES
These speculations point to only a few key conclusions regarding the role of
state-owned enterprises in future Latin-American exports.
First, the increasing role of state-owned enterprises in many raw materials
industries suggests that market prices will be more volatile, moving more vigor-
ously both in sellers' and in buyers' markets. The increased number of firms in
the market, coupled with the increased diversity of their interests arising out
of the fact that they are state-owned enterprises, tend to reduce the probability
that managed markets will prevail.
Second, the efforts of state-owned enterprises to increase the value of their
exports through further fabrication of their raw materials is likely to create a
period of indigestion in some products in the 1980s; the fact that such exports
will have been heavily subsidized in many cases will add to the tensions of
importing countries and increase the probability of import restrictions.112 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
Finally, the efforts of governments to promote the exports of differentiated
manufactures through state-owned enterprises could well succeed, especially if
such enterprises are left free to develop vertical structures or other arrange-
ments that link them firmly to the markets of the importing countries. But
governments probably would be chary about allowing such arrangements to
develop freely, lest the arrangements reduce the governments' capacity to
maintain effective control over the operations of the state-owned enterprises
involved.
NOTES
* The research on which this paper is based was financed in part by grants from
the Tinker Foundation and from the Associates of the Harvard Business School.
Brian Levy and Christian Koenig supervised or conducted much of the research.
1. In nonfuel minerals, according to data prepared by S. Malcolm Gillis from fig-
ures reported in [28], for the period 1979-85, government enterprises were scheduled
to invest in major projects valued at $12 billion, three times as much as the projects
of purely private enterprises.
2. These principles, when applied to other raw materials such as cooper and tin
ore concentrates, yield different pricing policies for the raw materials. Much depends
on where the largest barriers to entry are found in the vertical chain, and on the
relative importance of the raw material in the finished product.
3. The tendency to place a high price on crude oil was fortified until 1975 by cer-
tain important provisions of US tax law. See [17, pp. 1-11].
4. The balance of payment implications of higher crude oil prices vary according
to the situation of the importing country. For the US, for instance, the adverse bal-
ance of payments impact of oil imports is reduced by the profits retained and re-
patriated by the oil companies as well as by the investments of some of the proceeds
by the oil-exporting countries.
5. It may be, as some have suggested, that the oil-exporting countries, acting as
rational monopolists, placed a higher discount rate on future earnings than did the
oil companies. But in view of the process by which prices have been determined in
world oil markets since 1973, I am doubtful that such so-called "rational" calcula-
tions lay behind the price increases.
6. The motivation for such actions, rather than being responsiveness to the state's
demands, may be a desire of the enterprise manager to buy domestic political sup-
port [2].
7. Various annual reports of CVRD.
8. Information on Venezuela's abrogation of contracts in Europe was provided
in interviews with European buyers. According to them Peru also broke its long-
term contracts when it nationalized its iron ore mines in 1975. For other such cases,
see [19, p. 3la; and 36, pp. 309-11].
9. Confidential studies circulating within industry predict a supply shortage; but
other sources foresee surplus. For a wide range of published estimates, see [27, p. 78].
10. Saudi Arabia's Petromin, for instance, is already engaged in a series of deals
with various multinational oil and chemical countries which point in that direction.
These entail guaranteed deliveries of feedstocks for joint ventures in petrochemicals
facilities located in Saudi Arabia. See [29, p. D-3; and 30, p. D-l].STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 113
11. Even in such instances, however, the partner that controls the market outlet
could turn for its raw materials to alternative sources with which it has similar link-
ages. For details outside of iron ore, see [7].
12. I am indebted to Francisco Sercovich for his unpublished research on this
point.
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